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Floors and Ceilings in International Copyright Treaties
Berne, TRIPS, WCT Minima and Maxima
Jane C. Ginsburg

abstract
This paper addresses “ﬂoors” – minimum substantive international protections, and
“ceilings” – maximum substantive international protections, set out in the Berne
Convention and subsequent multilateral copyright accords. While much scholarship
has addressed Berne minima, the “maxima” have generally received less attention.
This Comment ﬁrst describes the general structure of the Berne Convention, TRIPS
and WCT regarding these contours, and then analyzes their application to the recent
“press publishers’ right” promulgated in the 2019 EU Digital Single Market Directive.
Within the universe of multilateral copyright obligations, the Berne maxima (prohibition of protection for facts and news of the day), buttressed by the TRIPS and WCT
exclusion of protection for ideas, methods and processes, should promote the free
cross-border availability of facts and ideas, as well as of exercise of the Berne
Convention mandatory exception for the making of “quotations” from publiclydisclosed works. Individual Berne countries of origin may protect excluded subject
matter or preclude mandatory exceptions in their own works of authorship, but not in
foreign Berne works. Nonetheless, Member States might be able to elude
Conventional maxima by resort to copyright-adjacent sui generis rights, such as the
Digital Single Market Directive’s new press publisher’s right. This Comment considers
the extent to which Conventional maxima may nonetheless have a preclusive effect on
such maneuvers.

Many thanks for comments and suggestions to Lionel Bently, Annette Kur, and James Parrish, and
for excellent research assistance to Eric Speckhard, Columbia Law School class of 2020.
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a. the two pillars of international copyright treaties
The Berne Convention and subsequent multilateral copyright accords rest on two
pillars: national treatment and supranational substantive obligations. National treatment is a rule of non-discrimination: a Member State may not accord foreign
authors less protection than it grants its own. But a second principle buttresses the
ﬁrst: whatever level of protection national law provides, a treaty Member State must
grant foreign authors protection commensurate with the treaty’s substantive standards. Most often that obligation means that Member States whose domestic laws fall
below the treaty minima must accord more protection to foreign authors. Berne’s
drafters anticipated that the political precariousness of such an outcome would
result in a general raising of the level of domestic protection as well.1 In the case
of Berne maxima, in theory a Member State could deny foreign Berne works the
protections that it extends to local authors, if that coverage concerns subject matter
that the treaties exclude – or rights that a mandatory exception mitigates. But, as the
drafters may also have anticipated, most national laws are likely to incorporate
Berne’s mandatory exclusions and exceptions, so that a downward discrepancy
between local law and the Berne norms seems improbable – or did until the passage
1

See, e.g., Sam Ricketson & Jane C. Ginsburg, International Copyright and
Neighbouring Rights: The Berne Convention and Beyond (Oxford, 3d ed. 2022) (hereafter Ricketson & Ginsburg), at para. 6.92.
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of art. 15 of the Digital Single Market Directive (hereafter DSM), on press publishers’ rights, called that assumption into question.
This paper addresses the “ﬂoors” (minimum substantive international protections)
and “ceilings” (maximum substantive international protections) set out in the Berne
Convention and subsequent multilateral copyright accords. While much scholarship has addressed Berne minima,2 the maxima have generally received less attention.3 I ﬁrst address the general structure of the Berne Convention, TRIPS and
WCT regarding these contours, and then analyze their application to the recent
“press publishers’ right” promulgated in the 2019 EU DSM.4
I. Meaning of “Minima” and “Maxima”
The Berne Convention contains many mandatory obligations regarding subject
matter and rights. These are the provisions denoted by “shall,” for example,
regarding protected subject matter, art. 2(1): “The expression ‘literary and artistic
works’ shall include every production in the literary, scientiﬁc and artistic domain,
whatever may be the mode or form of its expression . . ..” Another example is art. 2
(3): “Translations, adaptations, arrangements of music and other alterations of a
literary or artistic work shall be protected as original works without prejudice to the
copyright in the original work.”5
2

3

4

5

See, e.g. Ricketson & Ginsburg, supra note 1, Chapters 8–12; Silke von Lewinski,
International Copyright Law and Policy, paras. 5.94–5.147 (Oxford 2008); Paul
Goldstein & Bernt Hugenholtz, International Copyright: Principles, Law,
Practice (hereafter Goldstein & Hugenholtz), Chapter 9 (Oxford 4th ed. 2019); Paul
Edward Gellar, International Copyright: The Introduction, § 5, in Lionel Bentley (ed.),
International Copyright Law and Practice LexisNexis (2018).
Notable exceptions are Henning Grosse Ruse-Khan & Annette Kur, Enough Is Enough – The
Notion of Binding Ceilings in International Intellectual Property Protection (December 2008);
Max Planck Institute for Intellectual Property, Competition & Tax Law Research Paper, Series
No. 09–01; and Tanya Aplin’s and Lionel Bently’s monumental study of the Berne art. 10
quotation right, see Tanya Aplin & Lionel Bently, Global, Mandatory, Fair Use: The
Nature and Scope of the Right to Quote Copyright Works (Cambridge 2020) https://
doi.org/10.17863/CAM.39130 (hereafter Aplin & Bently). See also Susy Frankel, Challenging
TRIPS-Plus Agreements: The Potential Utility of Non-Violation Disputes, 12 Journal of
International Economic Law 1023, 1030 and n. 31 (2009) (acknowledging that TRIPs allows
Member States to legislate TRIPS-plus levels of protection, but suggesting that maxima may be
implicit in the structure and purpose of TRIPS: “higher levels of protection ought to have limits
consistent with the wording of the TRIPS Agreement, in light of its object and purpose, its
structure and the beneﬁts that can be expected from it”; but expressing scepticism about the
ability of speciﬁc substantive maxima to respond to technological change). See also the
discussion of Berne maxima in Ricketson & Ginsburg at paras. 6.118–6.123
Directive (EU) 2019/790 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2019 on
copyright and related rights in the Digital Single Market and amending Directives 96/9/EC
and 2001/29/EC, OJ L 130/92 (DSM Directive), art. 15.
For mandatory protected subject matter see:
Berne arts. 2(1) (literary and artistic works); 2(3) (derivative works [without prejudice to
underlying work]); 2(5) (collections of literary and artistic works [without prejudice]); 18
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By contrast, some subject matter provisions clearly signal their optional character.
For example, art. 2(4), “It shall be a matter for legislation in the countries of the
Union to determine the protection to be granted to ofﬁcial texts of a legislative,
administrative and legal nature, and to ofﬁcial translations of such texts” (emphasis
added here and subsequent citations). The formulation “It shall be a matter for
legislation in the countries of the Union” tells us that protection for the object is
permitted, not required – nor prohibited.6
With respect to rights, the same expressions identify the right or exception as
mandatory or left to local legislation. Hence, for example, art. 8 proclaims: “Authors
of literary and artistic works protected by this Convention shall enjoy the exclusive
right of making and of authorizing the translation of their works throughout the term
of protection of their rights in the original works.”7 But art. 11bis(2) states: “It shall be
a matter for legislation in the countries of the Union to determine the conditions
under which the rights mentioned in the preceding paragraph [various forms of
communication to the public] may be exercised . . ..”8
Now consider ceilings. Berne and subsequent treaties allow Member States to
create exceptions and limitations to exclusive rights, generally subject to a variety of
conditions. With one exception, Berne does not impose any restrictions on the
scope of rights.9 Because these derogations from exclusive rights are optional, they

6

7

8

9

(restoration of copyright in foreign works in public domain in newly acceding Member State);
TRIPS arts. 10(1) (computer programs protected as literary works under Berne); 10(2) (compilations of data if intellectual creations); WCT arts. 4 (computer programs); 5 (compilations
of data).
For optional protected subject matter, see: Berne arts. 2(4) (ofﬁcial texts); 2(7) (applied art.);
2bis(1) (political speeches).
For mandatory protected rights, see: Berne arts. 6bis (moral rights); 7 (duration); 8 (derivative
works); 9(1) (reproduction); 11, 11bis, 11ter, 14 (public performance and communication to the
public); 12 (translation); 16 (border seizure); TRIPS art. 11 (rental, under certain conditions);
WCT arts. 6 (distribution of hardcopies); 7 (rental, under certain conditions); 8 (making
available to the public); 11–12 (technological protection measures and copyright management
information).
Art. 11bis(2) nonetheless constrains the freedom allowed to Member States: “but these conditions shall apply only in the countries where they have been prescribed. They shall not in any
circumstances be prejudicial to the moral rights of the author, nor to his right to obtain
equitable remuneration which, in the absence of agreement, shall be ﬁxed by competent
authority.”
For permissible but not mandatory exceptions and limitations, see: Berne arts. 2bis(2) (press use
of public lectures); 9(2) (exceptions to reproduction right, “three-step test”); 10(2) (uses as
illustrations for teaching); 10bis(1) (press use of press articles); 10bis(2) (incidental use in
reporting current events); 11bis(3) (ephemeral recordings); TRIPS art. 13 (implicitly authorizes
exceptions and limitations to all exclusive rights, but “conﬁnes” them to the three-step test);
WCR art. 10(1) (may provide for exceptions to WCT rights, subject to three-step test); art. 10(2)
(shall conﬁne exceptions or limitations on Berne Convention rights to three-step test). The
Marrakesh Treaty to Facilitate Access to Published Works for Persons Who Are Blind, Visually
Impaired, or Otherwise Print Disabled, June 27, 2013, 52 I.L.M. 1312 (2013), discussed in
Graeme Dinwoodie’s contribution to this volume, is an extra-Berne treaty imposing mandatory
exceptions, both domestically and internationally, on Berne subject matter. Its consistency with
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are not maxima. We return to the one rights restriction that Berne prefaces with
“shall” after considering maximum subject matter.
The TRIPS and the WCT expressly incorporate the “idea–expression dichotomy,” that is, the exclusion of ideas, methods and processes from the subject matter
of copyright.10 The Berne Convention does not explicitly adopt this rule, although it
may be implicit in the overall concept of “literary and artistic works” or through state
practice, given that most or all Member States are likely – by text and/or by caselaw –
to exclude these elements from the scope of protection.11 The Berne Convention
goes further than the later accords in also removing facts from protection (though
this exclusion may also be implicit in those agreements). Art. 2(8) states: “The
protection of this Convention shall not apply to news of the day or to miscellaneous
facts having the character of mere items of press information.” As a result, a Member
State may not grant copyright protection to the ideas or facts (as opposed to their
expression) contained within the works of foreign authors. Again, the Berne minima
and maxima apply only to works of foreign Berne origin: “Protection in the country
of origin is governed by domestic law.”12
Turning to maximum rights under Berne, the art. 10(1) quotation provision is a
“shall” clause, qualiﬁed by a variety of conditions. However, on its face, it is a
direction to Member States to permit the making of “quotations from a work which
has already been lawfully made available to the public, provided that their making is
compatible with fair practice, and their extent does not exceed that justiﬁed by the
purpose, including quotations from newspaper articles and periodicals in the form of
press summaries.” This Comment does not explore art. 10(1) in depth,13 but examines the premise that it establishes a mandatory quotation “right” within its purview.

10

11

12

13

Berne norms is a matter of some controversy, see, e.g., Sam Ricketson & Jane C. Ginsburg, The
Berne Convention: Historical and Institutional Aspects, in Daniel J. Gervais (ed.),
International Intellectual Property: A Handbook of Contemporary Research
31–36 (Edward Elgar 2015); REPORT OF THE ALAI [Association Littéraire et Artistique
Internationale] AD HOC COMMITTEE ON THE PROPOSALS TO INTRODUCE
MANDATORY EXCEPTIONS FOR THE VISUALLY IMPAIRED, adopted by the
Executive Committee (Paris, February 27, 2010) https://www.alai.org/en/assets/ﬁles/reso
lutions/report-mandatory-exceptions.pdf.
TRIPS art. 9(2): “Copyright protection shall extend to expressions and not to ideas, procedures,
methods of operation or mathematical concepts as such.”; WCT art. 2: “Copyright protection
extends to expressions and not to ideas, procedures, methods of operation or mathematical
concepts as such.”
On “state practice” and the interpretation of the Berne Convention, see, e.g., Ricketson &
Ginsburg, supra note 1, paras. 5.22–5.23; Jane C. Ginsburg & Edouard Treppoz,
International Copyright Law: U.S. and E.U. Perspectives, 103–09 (Edward Elgar 2015).
Berne art. 5(3) Under EU law, however, facts and expression merged with facts are also
excluded, see Case C 469/17 Funke Medien v. Bundesrepublik Deutschland, ECLI:EU:
C:2019:623, para. 24: military reports are not “works” because they are “essentially determined
by the information which they contain, so that such information and the expression of those
reports become indissociable and that those reports are thus entirely characterised by their
technical function.”
Aplin & Bently, supra note 3, have extensively undertaken that task.
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Absent a mandatory character, art. 10(1) would not be a true maximum, and any
ceiling it imposes would in fact be retractable.
Aplin and Bentley contend that there are several reasons to believe that this
provision imposes a mandatory requirement for Member States to provide for a
quotation exception.14 The ﬁrst is the text: the language “shall be permissible”
indicates that the quotation provision is obligatory.15 That interpretation is bolstered
by the contrasting language used in other provisions that are optional. With the
exception of art. 10(1), Berne allows Member States to institute copyright limitations
and exceptions, but does not impose them. For example, the very next provision of
art. 10 speciﬁes that limitations related to certain educational uses “shall be a matter
for legislation in the countries of the Union.”16
Second, the records of the Stockholm Conference of 1967, where the present
language of art. 10(1) was adopted, also support the notion that art. 10(1) is mandatory. The language of art. 10(1) was initially proposed by the 1963 Study Group,
which repeatedly referenced the “right of quotation” and the “right to make
quotations” (emphasis added), again suggesting that the exception is required.17
Finally, Aplin and Bently point to existing commentary interpreting art. 10(1) as
mandatory.18 Among these, some commentators have suggested that the exceptional
mandatory status of art. 10(1) reﬂects its dual operation: it is a limitation that curbs
one author’s right in order to beneﬁt not only the general public but also other
authors, who in many ﬁelds rely upon the ability to quote other works.19 This
14

15

16

17

18

19

In the 2003 WIPO Guide to the Berne Convention, Ficsor notes that art. 10(1) is unique in that
it establishes a directly applicable limitation or exception in countries where the Berne Treaty
is self-executing, whereas all other exceptions and limitations in Berne expressly call for
national implementation. Nonetheless, as discussed below, Ficsor concludes that the art. 10
(1) quotation right is not in fact obligatory on Member States, at least in principle. See Mihály
Ficsor, 2003 WIPO Guide, para. BC-10.3.
It has also been pointed out that, in this respect, the French text is perhaps even clearer. There,
art. 10(1) provides “Sont licite les citations. . .” which indicates that quotations are permitted
rather than merely permissible. See Ficsor, supra note 14, at para. BC-10.2; Aplin & Bently,
supra note 3 at 29–43.
Berne Convention, art. 10(2). Similarly, art. 10bis Berne allows Member States to “permit the
reproduction by the press . . . of articles published in newspapers or periodicals on current
economic, political or religious topics” provided the source is clearly indicated. Berne
Convention, art. 10bis(1).
WIPO, Records of the Intellectual Property Conference of Stockholm, June 11 to July 14, 1967,
Vol. I, Doc. S/1, p. 46–47.
See, e.g., Goldstein & Hugenholtz, supra note 2, at § 11.4.1, p. 392 (“Article 10(1) of the Berne
Paris Text obligates members to permit quotations”); Ricketson & Ginsburg, supra note 2, at
para. 13.53; Annette Kur & Henning Grosse Ruse-Khan, Enough is Enough – The Notion of
Binding Ceilings in International Intellectual Property Protection, in Intellectual Property
Rights in a Fair World Trade System: Proposals for Reform of TRIPS, Ch 8, 359–407,
380 (Annette Kur & Marianne Levin (eds.), Edward Elgar, 2011); Annette Kur, Of Oceans,
Islands, and Inland Water – How Much Room for Exceptions and Limitations under the ThreeStep Test?, 8 Rich. J. Global L. & Bus. 287, 290 (2009); Kur & Grosse Ruse-Khan, supra note
3 at 18.
Kur & Grosse Ruse-Khan, supra note 3 at 18, 38–39.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009071338.014 Published online by Cambridge University Press

294

Jane C. Ginsburg

rationale, however, does not explain why permitted exceptions, many of which also
further downstream authorship, should not also be mandatory.20
Nonetheless, not all commentators agree that art. 10(1) is mandatory; some21
contend that the provision merely permits rather than requires a quotation right.
Ficsor, for example, has argued that because Berne expressly provides that Member
States can enter into agreements providing higher levels of protection,22 art. 10(1) is
not obligatory, at least in principle.23 Ficsor also notes that the practice of Member
States, speciﬁcally the European Union, has been to interpret art. 10(1) as optional.24
In particular, the InfoSoc Directive expressly provides that “Member States may
provide for exceptions and limitations” (emphasis added) regarding
quotations for purposes such as criticism or review, provided that they relate to a
work or other subject-matter which has already been lawfully made available to the
public, that, unless this turns out to be impossible, the source, including the
author’s name, is indicated, and that their use is in accordance with fair practice,
and to the extent required by the speciﬁc purpose.25

Aplin and Bentley also acknowledge that the practice of EU members has not been to
treat art. 10(1) as obligatory, with Sweden being one of the very few countries – or the
only one – that has enacted domestic legislation that fully implements the requirements
of art. 10(1).26 They contend, however, that the EU’s seemingly optional implementation of a quotation exception in the InfoSoc Directive is not necessarily in conﬂict with
the art. 10(1) requirement, as the Directive covers both Berne and non-Berne works.27

20

21

22

23

24
25
26

27

Kur & Grosse Ruse-Khan, supra note 3 at 18, distinguish optional limitations such as teaching
or news reporting, which they characterize as relying only on “public interests.”
See Mihály Ficsor, The Law of Copyright and the Internet (Oxford 2002), para. 5.09; Jørgen
Blomqvist, Primer on International Copyright and Related Rights (Edward Elgar 2014),
p. 159–60. See also von Lewinski, supra note 2, at para. 5.163 (indicating that support exists
for both positions).
For example, art. 19 Berne states: “The provisions of this Convention shall not preclude the
making of a claim to the beneﬁt of any greater protection which may be granted by legislation
in a country of the Union.” Similarly, art. 20 provides that “The Governments of the countries
of the Union reserve the right to enter into special agreements among themselves, in so far as
such agreements grant to authors more extensive rights than those granted by the Convention.”
Ficsor, 2003 WIPO Guide, supra note 14, at para. BC-10.3. Ficsor emphasizes that art. 10(1) is
not mandatory only in principle. As a practical matter, the ability to quote is “indispensable” as
it “follows from a basic human freedom – the freedom of free speech and criticism.” Id. at para.
BC-10.4.
Id. at n. 57.
InfoSoc Directive, art. 5(3)(d).
See Lionel Bently & Tanya Aplin, Whatever Became of Global, Mandatory Fair Use? A Case
Study in Dysfunctional Pluralism (May 2018), in Is Intellectual Property Pluralism
Functional? (Susy Frankel (ed.), Edward Elgar, 2018); University of Cambridge Faculty of
Law Research Paper No. 34/2018. For a review of European implementation of art. 10(1) see
Martin Senftleben, Bridging the Differences between Copyright’s Legal Traditions – The
Emerging EC Fair Use Doctrine, 57 J. Copyright Soc’y U.S.A. 521 (2012).
Aplin & Bently, supra note 3, at 35.
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In any event, while the scholarship is somewhat divided, the weight of authorities
seems to favor the interpretation that art. 10(1) is mandatory.28 Even among the
commentators who agree that quotation right is obligatory, however, there remains
some disagreement about the implementation of the right. Professors Goldstein and
Hugenholtz, for example, argue that “[a]lthough Article 10(1) is mandatory rather
than permissive, national legislatures presumably are free to prescribe the conditions
on which quotation is permitted,” and thus see no conﬂict in principle or practice
with the InfoSoc Directive.29 For purposes of this Comment, we grant the premise
that art. 10(1) is mandatory and therefore consider its application to the new EU press
publishers’ right.

II. Policy Underlying Berne “Maxima” and Its Preclusive Effect
A concern to maintain the free international ﬂow of basic elements of information
appears to animate and unite the Berne maxima. These provisions offer the
Convention’s strongest expression of solicitude for the broader public interest,
notwithstanding the Convention’s overall goal to protect the rights of authors. The
Convention cannot prevent a Member State from locally privatizing information its
own authors generate – that is the consequence of art. 5(3) – but it can require that
Member States preserve the freedom of these excluded elements when the works
that contain them traverse borders. Thus, if national legislation purports to grant
protection to Union authors in such cases, this must be contrary to the Convention.
Nor would Berne art. 19 change that conclusion. That provision declares that
“[t]he provisions of this Convention shall not preclude the making of a claim to the
beneﬁt of any greater protection which may be granted by legislation in a country of
the Union.” It addresses protection for works of authorship and therefore still comes
within the general Berne framework. Under art. 5(1), authors enjoy rights “in respect
of works for which they are protected under this Convention . . ..” Works, or
elements of works, omitted or excluded from Berne subject matter thus fall outside
the ambit of art. 19, and Union authors therefore have no treaty entitlement to
protection for such subject matter. But the concept of Berne maxima goes further, in
that it would deny Member States the option of according foreign Union authors
copyright protection to certain subject matter (the news of the day). By the same
token, while art. 19 clearly extends to rights in protected subject matter that are not
speciﬁed among the mandatory minimum rights of the Convention, it should be
understood as entitling Union authors to claim “greater protection” in Member
States so long as their domestic law is not inconsistent with Berne norms. Member
States may supplement Berne minimum rights but may not undermine the policies
underlying the principle of maximum protection. Whether as a matter of national
28
29

See also Ricketson & Ginsburg, supra note 1, at para. 13.41 point 5.
Goldstein & Hugenholtz, supra note 2, at 392.
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treatment under art. 5(1), or of claim to greater rights under art. 19 (which, in this
respect, reinforces the rule of national treatment to make clear that the rule extends
beyond Convention’s minima), if domestic protection is “greater” because, for
example, the Member State does not provide for quotation rights, that State may
not insulate foreign Berne works from acts coming within the scope of art. 10(1),
because the Member State would thus be rendering impermissible that which
Berne declares “shall be permissible.”
This reading of art. 19 can draw on support from Berne art. 20. This provision
permits Berne Union members to enter into “special agreements among themselves,
in so far as such agreements grant to authors more extensive rights than those
granted by the Convention, or contain other provisions not contrary to this
Convention.” If those agreements exceed the Berne maxima, then they contravene
art. 20. One might imply a similar limitation in art. 19. Admittedly, one might
instead contend, by way of negative inference, that the absence of a similar proviso
in art. 19 suggests that Union authors may claim greater protection in a Member
State even if that state’s domestic protection contravenes Berne. Such a textually
permissible reading, however, seems inconsistent with the overall structure and
goals of Berne.
On the other hand, the “special agreements” that art. 20 references concern
authors’ rights; they are copyright agreements. If Berne, TRIPS and the WCT
prohibit copyright coverage of ideas and facts, does it follow that Member
States may not protect those elements by other means – such as a sui generis
neighboring right (which would, in effect, remove the malodor by applying any
other name to the same stinkweed) or by resort to another international norm, such
as the Paris Convention art. 10bis guarantee of protection against unfair competition?30 Can one derive a preclusive effect of Berne, TRIPS and WCT from those
exclusions, or does the path remain open to Member States to pursue protection by
other means? DSM Directive art. 15 casts those questions into sharp relief, as we see
in the next part.

b. berne/trips/wct maxima applied: the case of the dsm
directive art. 15 press publishers’ right
First, an overview of the provision and its rationale, as set out in the accompanying
Recitals. Art. 15 provides, in relevant part:

30

Paris Conv. art. 10bis provides:
“(1) The countries of the Union are bound to assure to nationals of such countries
effective protection against unfair competition.
(2) Any act of competition contrary to honest practices in industrial or commercial
matters constitutes an act of unfair competition.”
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Protection of press publications concerning online uses
1. Member States shall provide publishers of press publications established in a
Member State with the rights provided for in Article 2 and Article 3(2) of
Direcve 2001/29/EC [reproduction and communication to the public] for the
online use of their press publications by information society service providers.
...
The rights provided for in the ﬁrst subparagraph [of art. 15(1)] shall not apply in
respect of the use of individual words or very short extracts of a press publication.

Art. 2(4) deﬁnes “press publications” as follows:
‘[P]ress publication’ means a collection composed mainly of literary works of a
journalistic nature, but which can also include other works or other subject
matter, and which:
(a) constitutes an individual item within a periodical or regularly updated
publication under a single title, such as a newspaper or a general or special
interest magazine;
(b) has the purpose of providing the general public with information related to
news or other topics; and
(c) is published in any media under the initiative, editorial responsibility and
control of a service provider.
Periodicals that are published for scientiﬁc or academic purposes, such as scientiﬁc journals, are not press publications for the purposes of this Directive.

i. Why Create a Press Publishers’ Right?
The EU Commission perceived that the practices among third-party online services
of news aggregation and other copying from the websites of newspapers and
periodicals threatened those publications’ continued existence.31 The Commission
therefore provided a two-year32 neighboring right33 of the “the same scope as the
rights of reproduction and making available to the public provided for in [the
Information Society] Directive” and subject to “the same provisions on exceptions
and limitations as those applicable to the rights provided for in [that] Directive,
including the exception in the case of quotations for purposes such as criticism or
review provided for in art. 5(3)(d) of that Directive.”34 The objectives are clear,
namely to insulate press publishers from online services’ predatory practices and to
31

32
33
34

See Recital 54: “Publishers of press publications are facing problems in licensing the online use
of their publications to the providers of those kinds of services, making it more difﬁcult for them
to recoup their investments. In the absence of recognition of publishers of press publications as
rightholders, the licensing and enforcement of rights in press publications regarding online
uses by information society service providers in the digital environment are often complex and
inefﬁcient.”
Art. 15(4).
Recital 55 refers to “rights related to copyright.”
Recital 57.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009071338.014 Published online by Cambridge University Press

298

Jane C. Ginsburg

require remuneration for the services’ copying and communication to the public.35
But art. 15’s subject matter coverage is unclear.36 On the one hand, Recital 57 states:
“The rights granted to publishers of press publications should not . . . extend to mere
facts reported in press publications.” Recital 58 reinforces that exclusion. While
extending the neighboring right to “parts of press publications,” it cautions,
such uses of parts of press publications have also gained economic relevance. At the
same time, the use of individual words or very short extracts of press publications by
information society service providers may not undermine the investments made by
publishers of press publications in the production of content. Therefore, it is
appropriate to provide that the use of individual words or very short extracts of press
publications should not fall within the scope of the rights provided for in this
Directive. Taking into account the massive aggregation and use of press publications by information society service providers, it is important that the exclusion of
very short extracts be interpreted in such a way as not to affect the effectiveness of the
rights provided for in this Directive.
(Emphasis supplied.)

The highlighted phrase suggests that the meaning of “very short extracts” may
depend on the signiﬁcance of the economic impact of the appropriation of those
extracts. In some instances, “the use of individual words or very short extracts of press
publications by information society service providers may [might] not undermine
the investments made by publishers of press publications in the production of
content,” but in other cases, the practice of “massive aggregation” of small amounts
of content by service providers could cumulatively cause economic harm. An
effective remedy therefore might need to apply granularly. But would such relief
run afoul of Berne’s subject-matter limitations?

ii. Does Art. 15 DSM Bestow Copyright Protection on Berne-Excluded
Subject Matter?
To the extent that art. 15 DSM provides extra-national copyright protection to the
“news of the day” or “mere items of press information,” it would violate art. 2(8)
Berne. Whether the rights conferred qualify as copyright, that is, “the protections of
[the Berne] Convention,” or are more accurately characterized as a sui generis
system of protection, is discussed in the section below. Here, the question is whether
“press publications” include the subject matter expressly excluded under art. 2
(8) Berne.
35

36

Art. 15(5) assumes that publishers will be paid by the services, because it provides for revenuesharing with authors.
For a fuller analysis see Elżbieta Czarny-Drożdżejko, The Subject-Matter of Press Publishers’
Related Rights under Directive 2019/790 on Copyright and Related Rights in the Digital Single
Market, 51 IIC 624–641 (2020).
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To begin, it is necessary to determine the scope of the exclusions in art. 2(8).
What qualiﬁes as “news of the day” or “items of press information”? The provision
excluding the news of the day and items of press information from protection was
moved from art. 9 to art. 2 during the 1967 Stockholm Conference revisions.37 As the
Records of the Conference indicate, “[t]he precise meaning of the provision is far
from clear.”38 The question of whether the provision could be improved or clariﬁed
was ﬁrst raised by the Permanent Committee at its 1958 session in Geneva and
subsequently discussed by the Study Group in its 1963 Report.39 In its report, the
Study Group ultimately adopted the following understanding of the provision:
The correct meaning of this provision is that it excludes from protection articles
containing news of the day or miscellaneous information, provided that such
articles have the character of mere items of news, since news of this kind does
not fulﬁll the conditions required for the admission to the category of literary or
artistic works.40

Thus, the role of the provision was merely “to recall the general principle whereby
the title to protection of articles of this kind, as in the case of other intellectual works,
pre-supposes the quality of literary or artistic works within the meaning of the
Convention.”41
Note that the Study Group perceived the exclusion to apply to entire articles and
not merely to the information they contained. It appears that the Study Group
assumed that the articles would be so devoid of authorship as to fail to qualify as a
“literary or artistic work.” As such, the Study Group considered the “news of the day”
exclusion to be a “superﬂuous element,” but retained the provision nonetheless.
Moreover, although there had been some discussion of modifying the provision to
improve its clarity, the Study Group concluded that no modiﬁcation was necessary
as “it would be sufﬁcient to discuss the question of interpretation in the documents
of the Conference.”42 That position was reafﬁrmed in the Study Group’s 1964
Report.43
The report of the Main Committee on the Programme of the Conference
reiterates this view. The report concluded that “the provision only seeks to establish
that the Convention does not protect mere items concerning the news of the day or
miscellaneous facts (and, a fortiori, the news or the facts themselves).”44 The
provision was not intended, however, to exclude “articles” or “other journalistic
37

38
39
40
41
42
43
44

WIPO, Records of the Intellectual Property Conference of Stockholm, June 11 to July 14, 1967,
Vol. I, Doc. S/1, p. 18–19.
Id.
Id. at Doc. S/1, p. 45.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at Doc. S/1, p. 46.
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works reporting the news . . . if they can be considered as works within the meaning
of the Convention.”45 On this point, the Committee believed, it could “hardly be
claimed that there [was] any obvious need to clarify the text of the Convention. . ..”46
Thus, art. 2(8) appears to function less as a provision of exclusion so much as a
reiteration that recitations of facts that do not themselves qualify as intellectual
creations, and which therefore are not literary or artistic works, are not included.
The commentary on art. 2(8) is in accord with that conclusion. The 1978 Guide
to the Berne Convention interprets the provision to exclude not only news and facts
but also “the simple telling of them, since matters of this kind lack the necessary
conditions to be considered as falling into the category of literary and artistic
works.”47 Masouyé, the author of the 1978 WIPO Guide, viewed the provision as
merely conﬁrming “the general principle that for a work to be protected, it must
contain a sufﬁcient element of intellectual creation.”48 Thus, while stories “related
with a measure of originality” are protected under art. 2(1), “simple account[s], arid
and impersonal, of news and miscellaneous facts” are not.49
Given the above understanding, art. 15 DSM would violate art. 2(8) Berne if its
protection of press publications extends either to facts themselves or to mere
recountings of facts that lack sufﬁcient original expression. As deﬁned in the DSM
Directive, press publications are certain collections “mainly composed of literary
works of a journalistic nature, but which may include other works or other subject
matter.”50 While “literary works,” and “works” generally, are properly the subject of
copyright protection under Berne51, the possibility of inclusion of “other subject
matter” within the scope of protection raises a potential conﬂict with art. 2(8) Berne.
Speciﬁcally, would the “news of the day” and “items of press information” be
included within this “other subject matter” and consequently protected?
Recital 56 of the DSM Directive provides some elaboration on the scope of
protection. In particular, Recital 56 clariﬁes that “press publications contain mostly
literary works, but increasingly include other types of works and other subject matter,
in particular photographs and videos.”52 Though presumably not exhaustive, the
illustrative examples of photographs and videos as other types of work and subject
matter suggest the Directive is not intended to cover the otherwise unprotectable
“news of the day” or “items of press information,” since photographs and videos
generally qualify as artistic works. Recital 57 is more explicit: the rights granted to
publishers of press publications “should also not extend to mere facts reported in
45
46
47
48
49

50
51
52

Id.
Id.
Claude Masouyé, WIPO Guide to the Berne Convention (1978), para. 2.27.
Id.
Id. The 2003 WIPO Guide, perhaps deferring to the belief of the 1963 Study Group, merely
quotes the Conference records provided above.
DSM Directive, art. 2(4) (emphasis added).
See Berne Convention, art. 2(1).
DSM Directive, Recital 56.
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press publications.” Still, as explained above, art. 2(8) appears to extend slightly
beyond the facts themselves and also excludes sterile accounts of facts, regardless of
length. Thus, while art. 15 may not protect facts or “individual words or very short
extracts of a press publication,”53 to the extent that it protects press publications that
include factual accounts too lacking in originality to support a copyright,54 the
Directive may be covering subject matter excluded under art. 2(8) Berne.
Moreover, as discussed above, the potential for coverage of economically valuable
“very short extracts” might create tension with Berne art. 2(8).

iii. May the EU Protect Berne-Adjacent Subject Matter through Sui Generis
Systems?
Art. 2(8) Berne excludes certain subject matter from copyright protection, but it
generally does not prevent Union members from protecting that subject matter
under different regimes, including sui generis forms of protection (see discussion
below). An initial question then is whether art. 15 DSM vests publishers with
copyrights in press publications or instead establishes a sui generis system.
Although art. 15(1) DSM nominally provides the same copyright protections as
conferred in arts. 2 and 3 of the InfoSoc Directive, it limits those rights in important
ways not consistent with other copyright protection. Perhaps most importantly, the
primary beneﬁciary and holder of the right is not necessarily the author(s) but the
publisher.55 Second, the term of protection is limited to just two years, beginning
with publication – in contrast to Berne’s minimum ﬁfty years post mortem auctoris).56 Additionally, the scope of the art. 15 right is limited speciﬁcally to “online
use[s]” by information service providers and does not apply “to the acts of hyperlinking.”57 Recital 55 also makes clear that the rights granted are not copyrights per se
but “rights related to copyright.” Finally, the granting of rights is not expressly
53
54

55

56
57

DSM Directive, art. 15(1).
Potentially including algorithmically generated news reports that lack sufﬁcient human authorship to qualify as “works” under Berne.
DSM Directive, art. 15(1). However, note that art. 15(5) requires Member States to “provide that
authors of works incorporated in a press publication receive an appropriate share of the
revenues that press publishers receive for the use of their press publications by information
society service providers.”
Id. at art. 15(4).
Id. The extent to which unauthorized hyperlinking constitutes a copyright-infringing “communication to the public” is uncertain, given the evolving caselaw of the CJEU. See, e.g., Jane
C. Ginsburg & Alain Strowel, Copyright Liability for Hyperlinking, in Research Handbook
on IP and Digital Technologies, p. 217 (Tanya Aplin (ed.), Edward Elgar, 2020); Jane C.
Ginsburg & Luke Ali Budiardjo, Liability for Providing Hyperlinks to Copyright-Infringing
Content: International and Comparative Law Perspectives, 41 Columbia Journal of Law &
the Arts 153 (2018), https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship/2063; Alain
Strowel & Vicky Hanley, Secondary Liability for Copyright Infringement with Regard to
Hyperlinks, in Peer-to-Peer File Sharing and Secondary Liability in Copyright Law
(Alain Strowel (ed.), 2009); Matthias Leistner, Closing the Book on Hyperlinks: A Brief Outline
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predicated on the presence of original expression but rather the “organisational and
ﬁnancial contribution of publishers in producing press publications.”58
Given these signiﬁcant differences from the traditional copyright regime, there is
a strong argument that the rights granted in press publications are not just copyright
by another name, but instead are genuinely sui generis. One then must ask whether
the protection of this Berne-adjacent subject matter through a sui generis regime is
permissible. As Henning Grosse Ruse-Khan and Annette Kur observe, the ability to
protect Berne-excluded subject matter through different means is problematic.59
Nonetheless, both the records of the Stockholm Conference and the commentary
on the 1971 Paris text of the Berne Convention agree that such protection is
permissible. As described in the Conference Records, one of the utilities of art. 2
(8), despite its otherwise superﬂuous nature, was to “permit the conclusion that if
the articles concerned are protected by other legal provisions – for example, by
legislation against unfair competition – such protection is outside the ﬁeld of the
Convention.”60 Similarly, the provision helped to ﬁx “the line of demarcation
between copyright and other means of protection.”61 Thus, the possibility of other
means of protection was expressly contemplated and was not accompanied by any
signs of disapproval.
Commentary on art. 2(8) also endorses the view that sui generis protection is
permissible. Professors Goldstein and Hugenholtz state that “[l]ike ideas, news of the
day and data compilations may be protected outside copyright under unfair competition law, neighboring rights, or sui generis regimes.”62 Similarly, in the 2003 WIPO
Guide, Ficsor notes that the subject matter of art. 2(8) can be protected “on the basis
of some legal institutions other than copyright – such as a sui generis system for the
protection of databases and their contents, or unfair competition. . ..”63 Other
commentators agree.64 Indeed, although they acknowledge that the results may be

58
59

60
61
62
63
64

of the CJEU’s Caselaw and Proposal for European Legislative Reform, 39 Eur. Intell. Prop.
Rev. 327 (2017).
DSM Directive, Recital 55.
Kur & Grosse Ruse-Khan, supra note 3, at 44. See also Annette Kur & Roberto Romandini’s
contribution in this volume.
Records at Doc. S/1, p. 45.
Id.
Goldstein & Hugenholtz, supra note 2, at 220.
Ficsor, supra note 14, at para. BC-2.73.
See, e.g., Laurence R. Helfer, Adjudicating Copyright Claims Under the TRIPS Agreement:
The Case for a European Human Rights Analogy, 39 Harv. Int’l L. J. 357, 358 n. 41 (1998)
(“Although the treaty ‘shall not apply to news of the day or to miscellaneous facts having the
character of mere items of press information,’ and provides that ‘[i]t shall be permissible to
make quotations from a work’ under certain conditions, these two isolated provisions do not
prohibit states from imposing higher levels of copyright protection in other areas, nor even from
protecting news, miscellaneous facts, and quotations under other intellectual property doctrines.”); Ricketson & Ginsburg, supra note 1, para 8.91.
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troublesome, Kur and Grosse Ruse-Khan emphasize that “the relevance of Art. 1(1)
TRIPS [and art. 2(8) Berne] is limited to mandatory exclusion of subject matter from
copyright, whereas it does not appear as a tenable position to argue that it also applies
if information or data are under a sui generis regime deliberately established for the
purpose of granting such protection.”65
The European Union’s adoption of the European Database Directive66 occasioned concrete application of the principle that a sui generis right might supply
protection withheld by the Berne Convention. Similarly to art. 15 of the DSM
Directive, the Database Directive provides sui generis protection with respect to
the substantial investment in the compilation of otherwise unprotectable data.
While the Database Directive has incurred both practical and theoretical objections,67 these criticisms have not evoked an underlying incompatibility with
Berne art. 2(8). Similarly, while a draft treaty proposing international protection
for databases was not adopted at the Diplomatic Conference on Certain
Copyright and Neighboring Rights Questions in 1996 (or anytime thereafter), there
is no record of objections premised on the exclusion of such subject matter from
copyright.68
Rather, the debate has centered around which form of legal protection – a sui
generis intellectual property protection or a misappropriation right sounding in
unfair competition – was best suited to the task of protecting the investment in
compiling databases. Advocates of more expansive and deﬁnite protection preferred
a sui generis right with more precise details, well-deﬁned term of protection, and
greater facility for licensing.69 Skeptics of the economic beneﬁts or necessity of
database protection favored the more limited protection of misappropriation
claims.70 In any event, the ability of Berne members to establish other forms of
protection, including sui generis intellectual property rights, seems to have
gone unquestioned.

65
66

67

68

69

70

Kur & Grosse Ruse-Khan, supra note 3, at 44.
Directive 96/9/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 11 March 1996 on the legal
protection of databases (Database Directive).
See, e.g., Jörg Reinbothe, The Legal Protection of Non-Creative Databases WIPO Doc. EC/
CONF/99/SPKl22-A (September, 1999); H. Cohen-Jehoram, Two Fashionable Mistakes, 2
Eur. Intell. Prop. Rev. 103 (2000); J. Gaster, The EC Sui Generis Right Revisited After
Two Years: A Review of the Practice of Database Protection in the 15 EU Member States, 5
Tolley’s Communication Law, 87–98 (2000); Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright, Common Law,
and Sui Generis Protection of Databases in the United States and Abroad, 66 U. Cin. L. Rev.
151 (1997).
See WIPO, Records of the Diplomatic Conference on Certain Copyright and Neighboring
Rights Questions of Geneva 1996, Vol. I (1999).
See, e.g., Jörg Reinbothe & Silke von Lewinski, The WIPO Treaties on Copyright (2d
ed., Oxford 2015), para. 13.0.19.
Id.
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iv. Even Were a Sui Generis Right in Berne-Excluded Subject Matter
Permissible, Must Exceptions to That Right Be Interpreted Co-extensively with
the Berne Art. 10(1) Quotation Right?
In the absence of a full examination of what constitutes a “quotation” under Berne
art. 10(1),71 one may nonetheless question whether the press publisher’s right is
compatible with Berne art. 10(1). Art. 15(3) of the Berne Convention directs that
the exceptions set out in the 2001 InfoSoc Directive “shall apply mutatis mutandis in
respect of the rights provided for in paragraph 1 of this Article.”72 The incorporation
in the InfoSoc Directive of an optional quotation privilege in terms nearly identical
to Berne art. 10(1)73 suggests that one may avoid discrepancies between the two
instruments by interpreting art. 15 DSM co-extensively with InfoSoc Directive art. 5
(d), which, in turn should track Berne art. 10(1). In that event, the copyright-adjacent
nature of art. 15, while potentially problematic with respect to covered subject
matter, will not immunize the press publishers’ right from third parties’
quotation rights.
There are two caveats to the above. First, the quotation right in Berne, according
to most commentators, is mandatory: Member States must allow quotations (within
the contours of the right). By contrast, the InfoSoc Directive leaves the list of
permitted exceptions and limitations in art. 5(3) up to national adoption (or not).
On the other hand, DSM Directive art. 17(7) makes the quotation exception (among
others) mandatory with respect to content posted by users to Online Content
Sharing Service Providers.74 While art. 17, on the liability of Online Content
Sharing Service Providers for infringing content posed by their users, addresses a
different problem from the one that occasioned art. 15, there may be some overlap
between the entities that are Online Content Sharing Service Providers under art. 17
71
72
73

See Aplin & Bently, supra note 3.
See also Recital 57.
InfoSoc Directive Art. 5 provides in relevant part:
“3. Member States may provide for exceptions or limitations to the rights provided for in
Articles 2 and 3 in the following cases: . . .
(d) quotations for purposes such as criticism or review, provided that they relate to a
work or other subject-matter which has already been lawfully made available to the
public, that, unless this turns out to be impossible, the source, including the author’s
name, is indicated, and that their use is in accordance with fair practice, and to the
extent required by the speciﬁc purpose”;

74

Berne art. 10(1) states: “It shall be permissible to make quotations from a work which has
already been lawfully made available to the public, provided that their making is compatible
with fair practice, and their extent does not exceed that justiﬁed by the purpose, including
quotations from newspaper articles and periodicals in the form of press summaries.”
DSM Directive Art. 17(7) states in relevant part: “Member States shall ensure that users in each
Member State are able to rely on any of the following existing exceptions or limitations when
uploading and making available content generated by users on online content-sharing services:
(a) quotation . . . .”
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and the “information society service providers” that are subject to the press publishers’ right. Arguably, the European Union may be creeping toward substantive
equivalence with the Berne norm with respect to its mandatory character.75
Second, even assuming third parties will enjoy quotation rights in press publications, the scope of the quotation exception may differ between InfoSoc Directive
art. 5(3)(d) and DSM Directive art. 15(3). The same words may mean different
things in different contexts, and the requirement that the quotation be “in accordance with fair practice” may impose different constraints on the exercise of the
quotation right. Given that the practice of news aggregation spurred the enactment
of art. 15, the size and amount of the “quotations” and their economic impact may
bear more heavily on the assessment of incompatibility with fair practice for press
publications than courts might tolerate for works of authorship. Thus, interpretation
of the two instruments may not be fully coextensive: the principles may be the same,
but their application may not yield identical results. (However, the same might be
said of the assessment of “fair practice” across different kinds of works of authorship,
or regarding different purposes for the quotations.)
The adoption in art. 15 of the InfoSoc Directive exceptions avoids a confrontation
between Berne norms and an unbounded sui generis right over subject matter that
includes works of authorship as well as Berne-excluded content. Recall that DSM
Directive art. 2(4) deﬁnes press publications to cover “an individual item within a
periodical”; that item generally will be a whole article or a substantial extract
(Recital 58 generally excludes “very short extracts,” though the meaning of the term
may vary with economic impact). Acknowledging that a neighboring rights regime
over Berne-excluded subject matter may coexist with copyright,76 one may still
inquire whether Berne maxima should exert a preclusive effect when the subject
matter of the sui generis right includes works of authorship. If, for example, art. 15
covered both copyrightable and non-copyrightable content, but did not also incorporate copyright exceptions, so that a quotation exception would not limit the scope
of the press publishers’ right, then publishers could invoke the sui generis right to
prevent quotations from the same copyrightable content to which their rights under
copyright must yield.77 The argument for a Berne-preclusive effect seems strongest
75

76
77

See also Case C-476/17 Pelham v. Ralf Hütter ECLI:EU:C:2018:1002, Opinion of Advocate
General Szpunar, para. 77 suggesting the need to interpret EU copyright exceptions in light of
mandatory human rights: “[T]he exclusive rights provided for unconditionally and compulsorily for the Member States in Articles 2 to 4 of [InfoSoc] Directive 2001/2009 are subject only to
the exceptions and limitations listed exhaustively in Article 5(1) to (3) of that directive. . . . It
should be noted, however, that that degree of latitude is also limited, since some of those
exceptions reﬂect the balance struck by the EU legislature between copyright and various
fundamental rights, in particular the freedom of expression. Failing to provide for certain
exceptions in domestic law could therefore be incompatible with the Charter.”
See discussion, supra part B.II.
A similar observation has been made regarding the overlap of copyright and sui generis rights in
the EU Database Directive (discussed more fully in the following paragraphs). See also Mark
Powell, The European Union’s Database Directive: An International Antidote to the Side Effects
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when the sui generis right covers both copyrightable and non-copyrightable content.
It should not be permissible to end-run the Berne quotation right by resort to sui
generis protection against copying the same subject matter.
Chapter III, “Sui Generis Right,” of the 1996 Database Directive, however, may
belie that proposition. As we have seen, the Database Directive covers both original
and non-original databases and provides a sui generis right against extraction and
reutilization of substantial parts (whether or not copyright-infringing) of databases
that are the fruit of substantial investment. While Chapter II, “Copyright,” of the
Directive permits Member States to provide for copyright exceptions “traditionally
authorized under national law,”78 Chapter III sets out three speciﬁc exceptions and
limitations (which do not include a quotation provision), without Chapter II’s openended catch-all.79 The restriction in Chapter III of the extraction right to “insubstantial parts” of the database80 will place some quotations outside the ambit of the
database holder’s exclusivity. But to the extent that a copyright-permissible “quotation” may be qualitatively or quantitatively substantial,81 Chapter III of the Database
Directive would appear to grant the rightholder a remedy, whereas Chapter II would
allow an exception. If non-copyright material entirely comprises the “quotation,”
then once one has admitted the premise that Berne Member States may establish sui
generis rights in copyright-excluded content, perhaps copyright limitations need not
constrain the scope of rights in that subject matter.82 But if the quotation comprehends a substantial extract of copyrightable expression, then Chapters II and III
appear to be in tension.83

78
79
80
81
82

83

of Feist?, 20 Fordham Int’l L.J. 1215, 1244 (1997) (“authors of copyrightable works contained in
a database may henceforth elect to invoke their sui generis right, rather than their copyright, in
order to side-step the fair dealing exception.”)
Database Directive, art. 6(2)(d).
Id. art. 9.
Id. art. 8.
As Aplin and Bently argue it should be. Aplin & Bently, supra note 3, at 101–04.
However, it seems problematic that sub-copyrightable content would receive more protection
than original works of authorship. One may draw a parallel with the decision of the Court of
Justice of the EU in Pelham, July 29, 2019, Case C-476/17 (Grand Chamber) in which a twosecond sample of a phonogram may violate the InfoSoc Directive art. 2(c) reproduction right in
phonograms if it is recognizable to the ear. The court (pts. 29–30) applied reproduction “in
part” literally, without considering whether the copied sample captured original authorship. By
contrast, in Infopaq, July 19, 2009, Case C-5/08, the court (pt. 47) inquired into whether the
copied portion communicated “an element which is, in itself, the expression of the intellectual
creation of the author of that article.” As Eleonora Rosati has observed, “while for works there is
an act of reproduction in part when what is reproduced is sufﬁciently original, for other subject
matter (e.g., phonograms), there is no need to consider whether what has been taken is
original.” Eleonora Rosati, The CJEU Pelham decision: only recognizable samples as acts of
reproduction? IP Kat, August 04, 2019, https://ipkitten.blogspot.com/2019/08/the-pelham-deci
sion-only-recognizable.html.
For discussions of this tension, see, e.g., Matthias Leistner, Big Data and the EU Database
Directive 96/9/EC: Current Law and Potential for Reform, 13–18 (September 07, 2018).
Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3245937 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3245937
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c. conclusion
Within the universe of multilateral copyright obligations, the Berne maxima, buttressed by the TRIPS and WCT exclusion of protection for ideas, methods and
processes, should promote the free cross-border availability of facts and ideas, as well
as of exercise of the quotation right. Individual Berne countries of origin may protect
excluded subject matter in their own works of authorship, but not in foreign Berne
works. Conversely, those countries must apply the quotation right to foreign Berne
works, but need not do so to their own. Nonetheless, there exist at least two
challenges to this equilibrium. The ﬁrst, as we have seen, concerns the potential
for Berne members to protect excluded subject matter, or to avoid the quotation
right, by resort to sui generis regimes. The second concerns the EU principle of nondiscrimination:84 Berne may limit protection in excess of its maxima to the country
of origin, but EU norms require Member States to accord full national treatment,
thus granting to works by other EU nationals the same scope of protection as the EU
country of origin provides its own authors.
This cornerstone of EU law potentially places EU Member States in conﬂict with
their international obligations: on the one hand, they may not – by copyright –
protect Berne-excluded subject matter in foreign works, including works by EU
nationals; on the other hand, EU norms oblige Member States to extend to other
EU nationals the protections Berne would deny them. The EU regional public law
obligation of national treatment thus may clash with international obligations
enshrined in Berne, TRIPS and the WIPO Copyright Treaties. As we have seen,
denominating the protections as sui generis might not sufﬁce to shield them from
the international treaties’ preemptive effect. If not, then, as the editors of this volume
observe in their preface, the international IP treaties produce “a level of global
harmonization of IP protection whose cumulative effect leaves little space for
different national policy choices.”

84

(“[T]he narrow exceptions to the sui generis right should at least be aligned and dynamically
linked with the exceptions to copyright law under the Information Society Directive. It is
therefore of considerable practical interest also to enable, and oblige, Member States to extend,
mutatis mutandis, the exemptions and limitations applying to works protected under copyright,
to sui generis protection of non-original databases. The obligation should be phrased so as to
establish a dynamic link between both ﬁelds, to the effect that limitations set out in new
copyright legislation would automatically also become applicable, under suitable terms and
circumstances, to the sui generis right.”). For comparison of the scope of exceptions to the
database right relative to rights under copyright, see, e.g., Annette Kur et al., First Evaluation of
Directive 96/9/EC on the Legal Protection of Databases – Comment by the Max Planck Institute
for Intellectual Property, Competition and Tax Law, Munich [2006] IIC 551, 556 et seq.
See, e.g., Case C-92/92, Collins and Patricia Im- und Export v. Imtrat and EMI Electrola
(October 20, 1993); Case C-360/00, Land Hessen v. G. Ricordi & Co. Bühnen- und Musikverlag
GmbH (June 06, 2002).
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